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Footnotes  
1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past Term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2000-2001 (Amer. Acad. of Jud. Educ. 2001).
2. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
3. 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
4. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court’s 2000-2001 term willalways be remembered for the Court’s role in deciding theoutcome of the contemporaneous presidential election.
Despite the notoriety of that decision, the rest of the term was
relatively uneventful.  Marked by recurrent split decisions, the
Court addressed significant issues regarding an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights in the face of technological advance
and law enforcement authority, the death penalty, and other
topics of criminal procedure.1
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,2 the Court held that
though Indianapolis’s vehicle checkpoint program was insti-
tuted to discover drugs in stopped vehicles by using narcotics
detection dogs, its “primary purpose . . .  [was] ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control”
and therefore contravened the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ment of “individualized suspicion.”  Though the city argued
that its program, like previously accepted drunk-driving
checkpoints, had the “ultimate purpose of arresting those sus-
pected of committing crimes,” the Court refused to accept
such a “high level of generality” because it would provide no
conceivable stopping point for law enforcement activity.”
Regarding the city’s secondary purpose of “keeping impaired
motorists off the road and verifying licenses and registrations,”
the Court pointed out that such a justification would permit
any checkpoints “so long as they also included a license or
sobriety check.”  The Court concluded that the Indianapolis
program lacked a specific “connection to the roadway,” unlike
a sobriety checkpoint that focuses on “immediate, vehicle
bound threat to life and limb.”  
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court in Illinois v. McArthur,3
held that police officers may deny individuals unaccompanied
entrance into their home for a limited time as long as there is
probable cause to believe that drugs are present and a reason-
able belief that those drugs would be destroyed without
restraining the occupant’s entrance.  Informed of the presence
of drugs, police officers refused to let Charles McArthur enter
his trailer unaccompanied until they could obtain a search
warrant.  Balancing the privacy and law enforcement interests
at stake, the Court pointed out four significant considerations
in this case.  First, the officers had probable cause based on the
testimony of McArthur’s wife that drugs were present.  Second,
they had good reason to believe that McArthur would destroy
the drugs before they could obtain a warrant.  Third, by merely
denying McArthur unobserved entrance, the officers “made
reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs
with the demands of personal privacy.”  Finally, the restraint
lasted only two hours, which is reasonable time to diligently
obtain a warrant.  Therefore, this brief warrantless seizure met
Fourth Amendment demands because it was “limited and tai-
lored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while pro-
tecting privacy interests.”
The Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston4 held that a state
hospital’s administration of nonconsensual drug tests to obtain
evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement
purposes does not comport with the “special needs” doctrine
and is an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment.
When a patient of the Medical University of South Carolina
was identified as using drugs during pregnancy, the hospital
immediately notified police, and the patient was subject to
arrest if she did not agree to treatment.  Identifying previous
cases that used the “special needs” doctrine to validate suspi-
cionless searches, the Court noted that it used a “balancing test
that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in pri-
vacy against the ‘special need’ that supported the program.”  In
those earlier cases, “there was no misunderstanding about the
purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results” and
there were “protections against the dissemination of the results
to third parties.”  The Court considered the hospital’s tests to
be a severe intrusion because patients have a “reasonable
expectation” that their test results “will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without [their] consent.”  Most signifi-
cantly, the Court asserted that when the “special needs” doc-
trine has been used, “the ‘special need’ that was advanced as a
justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized sus-
picion was one divorced from the State’s general interest in law
enforcement.”  Though the hospital’s policy ultimately sought
to protect the health of both mother and child, the Court
believed “the immediate objective of the searches was to gen-
erate evidence for law enforcement purposes” and therefore
concluded that “this case simply does not fit within the closely
guarded category of ‘special needs.’”  Moreover, the Court indi-
cated that if an “ultimate purpose” justification were sufficient,
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“virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be
immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the
search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate,
purpose.”  
A divided Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista5 held that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police officers from
making a full custodial arrest when they observe a minor vio-
lation, like failing to wear a seat belt, for which the penalty is
only a fine.  A police officer for the city of Lago Vista observed
Gail Atwater driving her pickup truck and neither she nor her
two small children were wearing seat belts.  After being
arrested and placed in jail for an hour, she was released on
bond and subsequently paid the fine for the misdemeanor seat-
belt offense, which was $50.  Atwater argued that pre-founding
English and early American common law prohibited peace
officers from making warrantless misdemeanor arrests unless
the offense was a “breach of the peace.”  To the contrary, the
Court recognized “considerable evidence of a broader concep-
tion of common law misdemeanor arrest authority unlimited
by any breach-of-the-peace condition.”  Further, statutes in all
50 states and the District of Columbia permit warrantless
arrests “for any misdemeanor committed in the arresting offi-
cer’s presence.”  The Court declined to “mint a new rule of
constitutional law” that would prohibit a custodial arrest when
conviction for the offense would not result in jail time.
Recognizing that Atwater would prevail under such a rule, the
Court nonetheless said that “a responsible Fourth Amendment
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive,
case-by-case determinations.”  Instead, the Court must “draw
[reasonableness] standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second guess-
ing months and years after an arrest or search is made.”
Moreover, the Court concluded that there are sufficient practi-
cal and statutory protections already in place, and if more pro-
tections are required in the future, it would be “easier to devise
a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one
through the Constitution.”  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor
criticized the majority for holding constitutionally permissible
an arrest that it recognized as “a pointless indignity” in the
name of “administrative ease.”  She stressed that “clarity is cer-
tainly a value worthy of consideration . . .  [but,] it by no
means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of
the Amendment’s protections.”  She warned that the Court’s
“per se rule . . . has potentially serious consequences for the
everyday lives of Americans” because “unbounded discretion
carries with it grave potential for abuse.” 
Justice Scalia, writing the opinion for the divided Court in
Kyllo v. United States,6 held that the use of a sense-enhancing
device that is not in general public use to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion is a “search” and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.  Danny Kyllo was suspected of
growing marijuana in his home, which typically requires high-
intensity lamps.  Officers used a thermal-imaging device to
scan the heat emanating from his home and determined that
the heat was consistent with the use of such lamps.  They sub-
sequently obtained a warrant and found more than 100 mari-
juana plants.  Noting that a warrantless search of the home is
generally unreasonable, Scalia explained that the relevant
inquiry is to determine “when a search is not a search.”  Citing
Katz v. United States,7 he explained that the Court had formu-
lated a two-part answer to that question: an individual must
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
search and society must be willing to recognize that expecta-
tion as reasonable.  Scalia observed that though “the advance
of technology . . . [has] uncovered portions of the house and
its curtilage that once were private,” the Court has never
decided “how much technological enhancement of ordinary
perception . . . is too much.”  Therefore, he set out to establish
a general principle that “assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted” and yet takes into account technol-
ogy “already in use or in development.”  Based on that princi-
ple, “the information obtained by the thermal imager . . . was
the product of a search.”  Scalia rejected the contention that
“the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected ‘only
heat radiating from the external surface of the house.’”  He
pointed out that this “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment” was also rejected in “Katz, where the eavesdrop-
ping device [placed on the outside of a telephone booth]
picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the
phone booth.”  To depart from this precedent “would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of technology—including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home.”
Although the government insisted that the thermal imaging
did not detect private activities in the home or reveal “intimate
details,” Scalia asserted, “in the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
from prying government eyes.”  Justice Stevens, in dissent,
argued that the thermal-imaging device only “gathered data
exposed on the outside of petitioner’s home” and should there-
fore be permissible because “what a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”  
In Saucier v. Katz,8 the Court held that “qualified immunity
requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question
whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest.”
During a speech by Vice President Al Gore in 1994, protester
Elliot Katz was apprehended, quickly “shoved” into a military
van, and briefly detained.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court “that ‘in the Fourth
Amendment context, the qualified immunity inquiry is the
same as the inquiry made on the merits,’” and accordingly
ruled “that the reasonableness inquiry into excessive force
meant that it need not consider aspects of qualified immunity,
[therefore] leaving the whole matter to the jury.”  The United
States Supreme Court overruled that ruling because qualified
immunity is intended to be “an entitlement [to officials] not to
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stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” such as “the
costs and expenses of trial.”  Accordingly, “a qualified immu-
nity defense must be considered in proper sequence . . .  [and]
a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings”
and not be fused with the constitutional analysis to be decided
later by the jury.    
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
In Ohio v. Reiner,9 the Court reversed an Ohio Supreme
Court holding that a witness who denies all culpability cannot
claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against testifying.  The
Court cited its holding in Hoffman v. United States10 that “it
need only be evident from the implications of the question, in
the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might
be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”
Thus, a person who claims innocence may still invoke the
Fifth Amendment as long as there is reasonable cause to appre-
hend incrimination from a direct answer at trial.  The Court
asserted that although it had previously “held that the privi-
lege’s protection extends only to witnesses who have ‘reason-
able cause to apprehend danger from direct answer,” it has
“never held . . . that the privilege is unavailable to those who
claim innocence.”  
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Seling v. Young,11 the Court held that a confinement
statute, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive “as
applied” to a single individual in violation of the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto clauses and thus provide cause for
release.  Andre Brigham Young was convicted of six rapes over
the course of three decades.  Upon release from prison, he was
found to be a “sexually violent predator” under Washington
State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 and therefore civilly
“committed for control, care, and treatment to the custody of
the department of social and health services.”  The Washington
Supreme Court found that the statute was “clearly intended to
create a civil scheme both in the statutory language and leg-
islative history,” and since its “goals of incapacitation and
treatment” were distinguished from a goal of punishment, it
did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses
of the Federal Constitution.  When Young claimed that he was
subject to confinement conditions that were punitive and
“incompatible with treatment,” however, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that “the actual conditions of his confinement could
divest a facially valid statute of its civil label” if there is clear
proof that it is “punitive in effect.”  The United States Supreme
Court held that this “as applied” analysis of the statute on
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto grounds was “fundamen-
tally flawed” and could not be used to provide relief.  The
Court explained that it must look at the “legislature’s manifest
intent” when determining whether an act is civil or punitive in
nature.  The Court also insisted that in evaluating the civil
nature of an act, courts must refer “to a variety of factors ‘con-
sidered in relation to the statute on its face’” and not on the
effect the statute has on a single individual.  In concluding that
the “as applied” analysis was “unworkable,” the Court said
that such analysis “would never conclusively resolve whether
a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a
final determination of the scheme’s validity under the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.”
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a divided Court in Texas
v. Cobb,12 held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches to offenses, though not formally charged, that are the
“same offense” under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United
States.13 In that case, the Court explained that whether the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel will attach to an uncharged
offense depends on “whether each provision requires proof of
a fact which the other [charged] offense does not.”  In the pre-
sent case, Raymond Cobb was indicted for burglary and was
appointed counsel.  While free on bond, Cobb confessed to his
father that he had murdered the occupants of the home he bur-
glarized.  Police took him into custody and administered warn-
ings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,14 which he waived.  He
then confessed to the police and was convicted of capital mur-
der.  Cobb argued that his confession should have been inad-
missible because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, which attached when counsel
was appointed for him on the burglary charge.  However, the
chief justice pointed out that under Texas law burglary and
capital murder are different offenses based on the Blockburger
test, and therefore the right to counsel did not attach to the
capital murder offense.  Thus, the confession was admissible.
In response to predictions that this “offense specific rule will
prove ‘disastrous’ to suspects’ constitutional rights” by allow-
ing police “complete and total license to conduct unwanted
and uncounseled interrogations,” the chief justice offers two
important considerations.  First, suspects are guaranteed their
rights against self-incrimination under Miranda.  Second, “the
Constitution does not negate society’s interest in the ability of
police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have
been charged with other offenses.”
THE DEATH PENALTY
In Penry v. Johnson,15 the Supreme Court reversed a Texas
court’s judgment sentencing John Paul Penry, a retarded man,
to death.  The Court failed to reach the question of whether the
Constitution prohibits the execution of the retarded, however,
overturning the sentence based on inadequacy of the jury
instructions.  When Penry was originally found guilty of capi-
tal murder, the jury was instructed to determine his sentence
by answering three statutorily mandated “special issues”
16. 121 S.Ct. 1693 (2001).
17. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
18. 121 S.Ct. 1578 (2001).
regarding: (1) whether he acted deliberately, (2) the probabil-
ity of his future dangerousness, and (3) whether he responded
unreasonably to any provocation.  The Court found, however,
that “the jury was never instructed that it could consider and
give mitigating effect to” evidence concerning Penry’s mental
retardation and past child abuse.  Therefore, the Court vacated
his sentence, emphasizing the fact that the three special issues
were not broad enough to provide the jury with a “vehicle for
expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced
to death based upon his mitigating evidence.”  During the
retrial, Penry was again found guilty and the trial court again
instructed the jury to answer the same three “special issues”
explaining that a “yes” to all of the questions would result in a
death sentence and a “no” on any issue would result in a life
sentence.  The jury was also given a “supplemental instruc-
tion” that informed them to consider and give effect to any
mitigating circumstances and that if they believed that a life
sentence was appropriate, “a negative finding should be given
to one of the special issues.”  However, “the verdict form itself
. . . contained only the text of the three special issues, and gave
the jury two choices with respect to each special issue.”  Penry
was again sentenced to death, and the Supreme Court again
vacated the sentence because the instructions “had no practi-
cal effect . . . [and] were not meaningfully different from the
ones [it] found constitutionally inadequate” in the first case.
The Court suggested that the “confusing” instructions were
problematic for two reasons.  First, the jury was “shackled and
confined within the scope of the three special issues” already
found inadequate to give effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence.
Second, to give effect to the mitigating evidence, the jury
would have been forced to “change one or more truthful ‘yes’
answers to an untruthful ‘no’ answer in order to avoid a death
sentence for Penry.”  The Court concluded that “it would have
been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to fol-
low both sets of instructions” because either the supplemental
instruction or the verdict form would have to have been
ignored.  
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Rogers v. Tennessee,16 the Court held that the retroactive
application of a judicial decision abolishing the common-law
“year-and-a-day rule” to uphold a murder conviction did not
deny a person of due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Wilbert Rogers was convicted of second-degree
murder for stabbing a person who went into a coma and died
15 months later.  Rogers asserted that according to common
law he could not be convicted because his victim had not “died
by [his] act within a year and a day of the act.”  The Tennessee
Supreme Court reviewed the rule’s justification and “found
that the original reasons for recognizing the rule no longer
exist” and, therefore, “abolished the rule as it had existed at
common law in Tennessee” and affirmed his conviction.  A
divided United States Supreme Court held that this retroactive
judicial abolition of the common-law rule did not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment.  It relied on its decision in Bouie v.
City of Columbia,17 where it “held that due process prohibits
retroactive application of any ‘judicial construction of a crimi-
nal statute [that] is unexpected and indefensible by reference
to the law which has been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue.’”  The Court considered this limitation on judicial deci-
sion making equally apposite in the common-law context
because it provides the courts with “the substantial leeway . . .
necessary to bring the common law into conformity with logic
and common sense.”  In reference to the “year and a day rule,”
the Court concluded that its abolition was not unexpected and
indefensible because it was created to compensate for the 
inadequacies of medical science in a time when it “was inca-
pable of establishing causation beyond a reasonable doubt
when a great deal of time had elapsed between the injury to the
victim and his death.”  Further, the Court recognized a trend
among the majority of jurisdictions in abolishing the rule as
relevant in determining whether it was unexpected and 
indefensible. 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In two cases this Term, the Court addressed whether crimi-
nal defendants may use habeas review under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act to collaterally challenge prior
convictions upon which a present sentence enhancement is
based.  The first decision to answer this question was Daniels
v. United States.18 Justice O’Connor, writing for a divided
Court, held that if an individual failed to pursue remedies (or
did so unsuccessfully) that were otherwise available to directly
challenge prior convictions while in custody for those convic-
tions, that person may not use a 28 U.S.C. section 2255 chal-
lenge of his present, enhanced federal sentence to collaterally
attack the prior convictions.  Section 2255 “permits ‘a prisoner
in custody under sentence of a [federal] court’ to ‘move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or cor-
rect the sentence’ upon the ground that ‘the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution.’”  The Court sup-
ported this conclusion by focusing on the “ease of administra-
tion and the interest in promoting the finality of judgments.”
The Court explained that “a district court evaluating a § 2255
motion is as unlikely as a district court engaged in sentencing
to have the documents necessary to evaluate claims arising
from long-past proceedings in a different jurisdiction.”
Regarding the interest in finality, the Court reasoned that “even
after a defendant has served the full measure of his sentence, a
State retains a strong interest in preserving the convictions it
has obtained,” noting that states “impose a wide range of dis-
abilities on those who have been convicted of crimes, even
after their release.”  The Court acknowledged a forum must be
provided in which “defendants may challenge their convic-
tions or constitutional infirmity.”  “But it does not necessarily
follow,” the Court ruled, “that a § 2255 motion is an appropri-
ate vehicle for determining whether a conviction later used to
enhance a federal sentence was unconstitutionally obtained.”
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In Justice Souter’s dissent, he criticized the Court for placing “a
flat ban on §2255 relief” for ease of administration and the
interest in finality.  He asserted that a prisoner should not “be
barred from returning to challenge the validity of a conviction,
when the Government is free to reach back to it to impose
extended imprisonment under a sentence enhancement law
unheard of at the time of the earlier convictions.”  Breyer con-
cluded, “In denying [a prisoner] any right to attack convic-
tions later when attacks are worth the trouble, the Court
adopts a policy of promoting challenges earlier when they may
not justify the effort and perhaps never will.”  
Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the same 5-4 major-
ity in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss.19 Referring
to its decision in Daniels, the Court extended that holding to
the 28 U.S.C. section 2254 context.  Section 2254 is “a post-
conviction remedy in federal court for state prisoners . . . avail-
able to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court’ if that person ‘is in custody in violation of the
Constitution.’”  The Court held “once a state conviction is no
longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . .
[and] is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defen-
dant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence
through a petition under §2254.”  The Court offered the same
considerations of ease of administration and interest in finality
to support this decision as it did in Daniels.  Justice Souter pre-
sented the same criticisms and concerns, declaring, “The error
of Daniels v. United States . . . is repeated once more.”  
In Tyler v. Cain,20 a divided Court held that a holding from
the United States Supreme Court is the only way a new rule of
constitutional law can be made retroactive within the meaning
of section 2244(b)(2)(A) of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.  After Melvin Tyler had been found guilty
of second-degree murder, the United States Supreme Court
decided Cage v. Louisiana;21 under Cage, “a jury instruction is
unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Because his jury instruction was
identical to the one criticized in Cage, Tyler filed a second fed-
eral habeas corpus application after Cage was decided.  Under
section 2244(b)(2)(A), a second or successive habeas applica-
tion can survive only if “the applicant ‘shows’ that the ‘claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was pre-
viously unavailable.”  The Court explained that it “is the only
entity that can ‘ma[k]e’ a new rule retroactive,” and “based on
the plain meaning of the text read as a whole, . . . ‘made’ means
‘held’ and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if this Court
has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.”  Though Tyler argued that the Cage rule
was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the rea-
soning of two other Supreme Court decisions, the Court con-
cluded that “[t]he most [Tyler] can claim is that . . . this Court
should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review,”
which it declined to do.  Justice Breyer argued in dissent that
“nothing in the statute’s purpose favors, let alone requires, the
majority’s conclusion.”  In addition, he said, “the most likely
consequence of the majority’s holding is further procedural
complexity.”  Breyer predicted that “we will be required to
restate the obvious, case by case, even when we have explicitly
said, but not ‘held,’ that a new rule is retroactive.”  He con-
cluded that “the Court’s approach will generate not only com-
plexity, along with its attendant risk of confusion, but also seri-
ous additional unfairness.”  
CONCLUSION
As the numerous 5-4 decisions demonstrate, the ideological
balance of the Supreme Court plays a significant role in the
outcome of many decisions.  Though none of the justices
retired this term, the longevity of this balance as well as its
influence on future criminal cases will ultimately depend on
the Court appointments President Bush is expected to make in
the coming years.  
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